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Forced Arbitration Leaves Workers in an Unequal
Position: What Washington State Can Do Under
the Threat of Federal Preemption
Arielle Inveen-Lai*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the United States Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the FAA’s authority have made it difficult for states to enact
laws prohibiting the use of mandatory arbitration in employment disputes
about sexual harassment or sex discrimination.1 The FAA strongly favors
enforcement of arbitration agreements,2 and the federal statute “is not easily
displaced by state law.”3 However, states should still endeavor to overcome
the FAA because “any change in employment laws regarding mandatory
arbitration will likely only be resolved in state legislat[ure]s.”4 The likelihood
of federal preemption merely means that Washington State will have to be
creative in its efforts to rid itself of forced arbitration of sexual harassment
claims.
The United States Supreme Court made clear in Epic Systems Corp. v.
Lewis that arbitration agreements will be found to be enforceable, and the
Supreme Court is, at least for the time being, significantly pro-arbitration.5
* J.D. Candidate 2021, Seattle University School of Law.
1 See Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 U.S. 1612 (2018).
2 Marsha Levinson, Mandatory Arbitration: How the Current System Perpetuates Sexual
Harassment Cultures in the Workplace, 59 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 485, 497 (2019).
3 Latif v. Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, No. 18 Civ. 11528, 2019 WL 2610985 (S.D.N.Y.
June 26, 2019).
4 Jonathan Ence, I Like You when You Are Silent: The Future of NDAS and Mandatory
Arbitration in the Era of #MeToo, 2019 J. DISP. RESOL. 165, 179 (2019).
5 Epic Systems Corp., 138 U.S. at 1612 (2018); Erin M. Morrissey, #MeToo Spells
Trouble for Them Too: Sexual Harassment Scandals and the Corporate Board, 93 TUL. L.
REV. 177, 196 (2018).
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Section 2 of the FAA declares that arbitration awards are “valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable”;6 therefore, Washington State’s focus should be on efforts
to first prevent the implementation of mandatory arbitration agreements in
employment contracts. In addition, Washington should explore other ways of
changing the culture that breeds forced arbitration and nondisclosure
agreements so that Congress will follow by amending the FAA.
To that end, this article will first consider the history of arbitration and
how mandatory arbitration clauses became increasingly present in
employment contracts. Second, it will detail the harm mandatory arbitration
causes to employees and set out the current state of the law. Last, this article
will suggest ways in which Washington State can limit the use of mandatory
arbitration for employees in the state and ultimately protect the rights of
employees who have been sexually harassed.
II. BACKGROUND
A. History of Arbitration and How It Made Its Way into Employment
Contracts
Arbitration is a form of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). “ADR
complements the judicial system by making methods available for resolution
of some disputes more economically or efficiently than can be done by the
courts.”7 In arbitration, an impartial person or persons, selected by the parties,
hears evidence from each party and makes a decision on the merits.8 This
decision is typically binding.9 Unlike in judicial proceedings, “[u]nless the
parties agree to the contrary, the arbitrator is not bound to follow the law, but
6 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947).
7 Jay E. Grenig, Evolution of the Role of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Resolving
Employment Disputes, 71 DISP. RESOL. J. 99, 100 (2016).
8 Id.
9 Id.
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may base the decision on business custom and practice, technical insight, or
broad principles of equity and justice.”10
The FAA was passed and signed into law in 1925.11 The FAA “made
arbitration clauses as enforceable as any other contract provision, subject to
the same defenses as applied to other contracts.”12 Today, in accordance with
the U.S. Supreme Court’s holdings, the FAA is substantive law that preempts
state arbitration laws regardless of whether a claim was brought in state or
federal court.13 When first enacted, the FAA was not meant to apply to
employment disputes.14 The Chair of the ABA Committee on Commerce,
Trade and Commercial Law testified, “[It] is not intended that this shall be
an act referring to labor disputes at all.”15 The Act was meant to be “purely
an act to give the merchants the right or the privilege of sitting down and
agreeing with each other as to what their damages are, if they want to do it.”16
Initially, the courts declined to apply the FAA to disputes between employers
and employees.17 It was not until the 1991 Supreme Court decision in Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. that arbitration started to become a common
means of employment dispute resolution.18 In Gilmer, the Court held that
“arbitration of claims of illegal age discrimination is not inconsistent with the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act,”19 and that as long as the
prospective litigant may bring her statutory cause of action in the arbitral
forum, the “[ADEA] will continue to serve its remedial and deterrent
function.”20
10 Id. at 100–01.
11 Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925).
12 Grenig, supra note 7, at 110.
13 Id. at 112.
14 Id. at 110.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 120.
18 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Grenig, supra note 7, at
126.
19 Grenig, supra note 7, at 121; see also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 20.
20 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28.
888 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE
In the early nineties, employers began increasingly requiring their
employees to sign mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration agreements.21 This rise
closely followed the important 1991 United State Supreme Court case,
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., which upheld the enforceability of
such arbitration agreements.22 By signing these agreements, employees
began waiving their access to the courts to settle claims of rights violations,
including sexual harassment.23 By 2018, the amount of workers subject to
mandatory arbitration exceeded fifty-five percent—more than double the rate
seen in the early 2000s.24 Employees of companies with 1,000 or more
employees are most likely to be subject to forced arbitration, at a rate of about
sixty-five percent.25 Also, forced arbitration is more common in low-wage
workplaces, industries disproportionately composed of female workers, and
industries disproportionately composed of African–American workers.26 In
2018, 60.1 million American workers could no longer access the courts to
protect their employment rights and instead were forced into arbitration.27
The prevalence of mandatory arbitration varies across industries, but industry
and demographic trends position women and African–Americans as the
workers most likely to be subject to mandatory arbitration.28 A striking
illustration of this fact is the contrast between arbitration statistics in the
construction industry and the education and health industries. Construction,
which has “a predominately male workforce, has the lowest rate of
imposition of mandatory arbitration,” whereas the female dominated fields
of education and health have the highest rate of imposition of mandatory
21 ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, THE GROWING USE OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION, ECON.
POL’Y INST. 1 (2018), https://files.epi.org/pdf/144131.pdf [https://perma.cc/6N6D-
WXS4].
22 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 20.
23 COLVIN, supra note 21.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 2.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 9.
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arbitration.29 Further, people in low-wage jobs are more likely to be subject
to mandatory arbitration, which is particularly problematic considering that
women in low-wage jobs “experience high levels of harassment because they
do not have bargaining power to push back.”30
B. Arbitration Hurts Employees
Companies are most often the beneficiaries of mandatory arbitration, and
so are increasingly including arbitration clauses in employment contracts.31
With mandatory arbitration policies in place, employers are less likely to face
claims from employees.32 When employers do face claims, they do so with
the benefit of dictating the arbitration process and procedures.33
1. Employers Have the Power
Employers can gain a significant advantage by controlling the arbitration
process—including choosing the applicable procedures and selecting the
arbitrator.34 By dictating the procedures, employers can implement different
evidentiary and procedural standards “that complicate the employee’s ability
to prove her case.”35 Further, because employers usually choose the
arbitrator, there are often repeat employer–arbitrator pairings, which leaves
29 Id. at 8.
30 Tara Golshan, Study Finds 75 Percent of Workplace Harassment Victims Experienced
Retaliation when They Spoke Up, VOX (Oct. 15, 2017),
https://www.vox.com/identities/2017/10/15/16438750/weinstein-sexual-harassment-facts
[https://perma.cc/E4UJ-9HTK].
31 COLVIN, supra note 21.
32 Id. at 10.
33 Morrissey, supra note 5, at 197.
34 Kathleen McCullough, Mandatory Arbitration and Sexual Harassment Claims:
#MeToo- and Time’s Up-Inspired Action Against the Federal Arbitration Act, 87
FORDHAM L. REV. 2653, 2659 (2019).
35 Morrissey, supra note 5, at 197.
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room for potential biases.36 In fact, there is evidence of a direct advantage to
employers when they use a repeat arbitrator.37
In other forms of arbitration, arbitrators understand that they will only
continue to receive business if both sides deem the arbitrator fair and
impartial.38 For example, in labor arbitration, both the union and management
must believe that the arbitrator is fair and impartial.39 However, “[in]
employment arbitration, it is the employer, as a repeat player, that usually
pays for the arbitrator.”40 Because of the lack of a need to show fairness and
impartiality to both sides, employment arbitrators may consciously, or
unconsciously, be biased in favor of the employer.41
In addition, studies suggest that employees are less likely to bring claims
to mandatory arbitration than they are to bring claims to court.42 Part of the
reason for this discrepancy is that attorneys are less likely to take clients that
are subject to mandatory arbitration because the “claims are less likely to
succeed than claims brought to court, and, when damages are awarded, they
are likely to be significantly smaller than court-awarded damages.”43 Few
employees are capable or willing to bring employment law claims without an
attorney.44 Nationally, about 5,758 mandatory employment arbitration cases
are filed per year.45 Considering the finding that 60.1 million workers in the
United States are subject to these procedures, this means that “only 1 in
10,400 employees subject to [forced arbitration] actually files a claim [in
arbitration] each year.”46 These findings are significant given that “if
36 McCullough, supra note 34.
37 Alexander Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and
Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 30–31 (2011).




42 COLVIN, supra note 21, at 10.
43 Id. (emphasis in original).
44 Id.
45 Id. at 11.
46 Id.
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employees covered by mandatory arbitration were filing claims at the same
rate as in court, there would be between 206,000 and 468,000 claims filed
annually,” which is thirty-five to eighty times the rate currently observed.47
2. Secrecy
Arbitration is frequently coupled with nondisclosure agreements (NDAs),
which can limit the information available to fellow employees as well as
investigators48 and can help protect repeat sexual harassment offenders.49
“NDAs are a key component of most settlements resolving a legal dispute. In
cases of sexual harassment in the workplace, NDAs prohibit the victim from
disclosing details about the settlement or facts which led to the settlement.”50
One of the many negative impacts that come from silencing victims is that
their coworkers who may be experiencing similar harassment “cannot use
their collective information to identify repeat offenders, who then go
undetected for a long period of time.”51 In addition, “[t]he privacy of
settlement agreements also reduces the overall accuracy and availability of
the statistics regarding settlement figures and the characteristics of sexual
harassment claims.”52 In effect, “NDAs [have] not only restricted survivors
from sharing their story cathartically, but [have] also given abusive men a
path to legally harass women while simultaneously holding onto positions of
power.”53 The secrecy provided by NDAs prevents necessary changes from
taking place to avoid future sexual misconduct in the workplace.54 A recent
example of this occurred at Fox News, where “[t]he network settled cases for
years without making the systemic and cultural changes necessary to stop
47 Id.
48 Margaret Ryznar, #MeToo & Tax, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 53, 55 (2018).
49 Id. at 54.
50 Ence, supra note 4, at 167.
51 Ryznar, supra note 48, at 55.
52 Id.
53 Ence, supra note 4, at 166.
54 Morrissey, supra note 5, at 197.
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sexual harassment.”55 Confidentiality agreements in settlements have
ramifications beyond the case at hand. Secret settlements “hinder the ability
of plaintiffs’ counsel to assess a fair settlement value and the viability of a
contingency fee arrangement, reducing access to representation.”56
Ironically, the lack of access to representation is the most commonly cited
reason to continue the practice of mandatory arbitration.57 Confidential
settlements also “hinder judges’ abilities to facilitate settlements by limiting
their access to information on the range of reasonable outcomes.”58 Further,
serious harm can occur from keeping discrimination claims out of the public
eye by “creating an inaccurately limited public perception of the extent of
discrimination in the workplace.”59
C. Current State of the Law
Recent Supreme Court decisions construe the FAA broadly and are
significantly pro-arbitration.60 The Supreme Court construes the FAA to
require arbitration of “statutory claims that were created decades after the
FAA was passed, such as claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (“Title VII”) and the ADEA.”61 Sexual harassment claims are included
under Title VII and are currently subject to forced arbitration.62
55 Kate Webber Nunez, Toxic Cultures Require a Stronger Cure: The Lessons of Fox News
for Reforming Sexual Harassment Law, 122 PENN STATE L. REV. 463, 513 (2018).
56 Id.
57 Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration: Why It’s Better than It Looks, 41 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 783, 792 (2008).
58 Nunez, supra note 55, at 513.
59 Id.
60 McCullough, supra note 34, at 2682; see also Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct.
1407 (2019); AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Kindred Nursing
Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421 (2017).
61 McCullough, supra note 34, at 2666.
62 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012); AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352
(2011) (holding the FAA preempts state law that is an “obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives” of the FAA).
Forced Arbitration Leaves Workers in an Unequal Position 893
VOLUME 19 • ISSUE 3 • 2021
1. United States Supreme Court Cases
Recent U.S. Supreme Court cases have demonstrated that the FAA’s
policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements is not easily
displaced by state law. State law will be preempted “to the extent it stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of the FAA.”63 Moreover, “[w]hen state law prohibits outright the
arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The
conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA.”64
In 2011, the Supreme Court decided AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion,
in which it found that the FAA preempts states from conditioning the
enforcement of an arbitration agreement on the availability of class-wide
arbitration procedures.65 The decision was significant in strengthening and
widening the reach of the FAA because the Court held that the FAA preempts
“state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s
objectives.”66 The Court focused its opinion on the “saving clause,” which
states that arbitration agreements are invalidated by “generally applicable
contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.”67 Ultimately,
the Court found that the saving clause “preserves generally applicable
contract defenses” but does not “preserve state-law rules” that stand in the
way of the enforcement of arbitration agreements.68 The Court held that any
state law that prevents the enforcement of arbitration agreements is
unenforceable and complicates states’ ability to disallow mandatory
arbitration.
63 Lamps Plus, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1415.
64 Latif v. Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, No. 18 Civ. 11528, 2019 WL 2610985, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2019).
65 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
66 Id. at 343.
67 Id. at 339 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2).
68 Id. at 343.
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In 2017, the Court made clear that the FAA preempts both state law and
rules that discriminate against arbitration.69 In Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd.
Partnership v. Clark, the Court held that the FAA preempted a Kentucky
State law that required a clear statement in the power of attorney agreement
allowing the attorney-in-fact to bind her principal to an arbitration
agreement.70 The Court found that rules that apply only to arbitration
agreements—or “covertly” discriminate against arbitration by disfavoring
contracts that have “defining features” of arbitration agreements—violate the
FAA because arbitration agreements must be on equal footing with other
contracts.71 In other words, states may not undermine the express purpose of
the FAA.72 Kindred Nursing effectively makes it more difficult for states to
implement laws that disfavor arbitration in any way, including forced
arbitration.
Most recently, in 2018, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to
upholding forced arbitration in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis.73 The Court held
that employers may require employees, as a condition of employment, to
waive their right to court as well as their right to pursue even private
arbitration in common with other employees making the same claim.74 The
decision in Epic Systems involved wage and hour claims, “[b]ut the Court’s
decision impacts all employment disputes—whether claims involve overtime
pay, sexual harassment, or discrimination in the workplace.”75 This is in part
because “[t]he Court’s decision is likely to encourage more employers to
require individual arbitration as a condition of employment.”76
69 Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 U.S. 1421, 1426 (2017).
70 Id. at 1427.
71 Id. at 1424.
72 See id.
73 Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 U.S. 1612 (2018).
74 Id.
75 Stephanie Greene & Christine Neylon O’Brien, Epic Backslide: The Supreme Court
Endorses Mandatory Individual Arbitration Agreements—#TimesUp on Workers’ Rights,
15 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 43, 45 (2019).
76 Id.
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2. Federal Law
Because of the high risk of federal preemption, the only guaranteed way
to prohibit employers from subjecting their employees to forced arbitration
is to enact federal laws that disallow mandatory arbitration of employment
disputes. However, such laws that have been introduced have faced heavy
opposition from Republicans and the business community.77
In a possible display of the energy brought on by the #MeToo movement,
the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act was introduced in
both the House and the Senate at the end of 2017 with bipartisan support.78
The bill provides: “[N]o predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or
enforceable if it requires arbitration of a sex discrimination dispute.”79
However, the bill “has not yet made it out of committee in either the House
or Senate due to opposition from Republicans and the business
community.”80
Another of these bills, the Forced Arbitration Repeal Act, or the FAIR Act,
“prohibits a predispute arbitration agreement from being valid or enforceable
if it requires arbitration of an employment, consumer, antitrust, or civil rights
dispute.”81 The bill passed the House in September of 2019 but has yet to
pass the Senate.82 Supporters of this bill argue that corporations are evading
accountability by preventing working people from using the courts to enforce
laws meant to protect them from abuse.83 Because corporations can require
77 Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Arbitration Stymies Progress Towards Justice in
Employment Law: Where to, #MeToo?, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155, 206 (2019).
78 Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of 2017, S.B. 2203, 115th Cong.
(2017); Sternlight, supra note 77.
79 Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of 2017, S.B. 2203, 115th Cong.
(2017).
80 Sternlight, supra note 77.
81 Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act, H.R. 1423, 116th Cong. (2019).
82 Id.
83 Vanita Gupta & Kristine Lucius, Support the Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act
(FAIR Act), H.R. 1423, THE LEADERSHIP CONF. ON CIV. & HUM. RTS. (Sept. 5, 2019),
https://civilrights.org/resource/support-the-forced-arbitration-injustice-repeal-act-fair-act-
h-r-1423/ [https://perma.cc/5QE4-DE29].
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employees to arbitrate their claims, employers have the benefit of “select[ing]
the arbitrators, prevent[ing] workers from asserting claims together,
pick[ing] the rules under which arbitration takes place, choos[ing] the state
in which the proceedings will occur, and decid[ing] the payment terms.”84
Although the FAIR Act may face resistance from Republicans in the Senate,
it is still significant that the bill was pushed through the house. The FAIR Act
is the first bill aimed against forced arbitration to make it past the House.85 If
passed, employers would no longer be able to require an arbitration
agreement as a condition of employment. The employer and employee would
be able resolve their claims in arbitration only if both parties agreed to the
forum after the dispute.
3. State Law
Washington State, New York, and California have each attempted to
protect workers from mandatory arbitration.
a) Washington State Senate Bills 6313 and 5996
The Washington State legislature has recognized that between twenty-five
and eighty-five percent of women have experienced sexual harassment in the
workplace.86 In response, the legislature has begun to craft laws that attempt
to protect women.87
84 Id.
85 Alexia F. Campbell, The House Just Passed a Bill that Would Give Millions of Workers
the Right to Sue Their Boss, VOX (Sept. 20, 2019),
https://www.vox.com/identities/2019/9/20/20872195/forced-mandatory-arbitration-bill-
fair-act [https://perma.cc/M7PN-9ZB8].
86 CHAI R. FELDBLUM & VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE (2016),
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_force/harassment/upload/report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/92K6-7VU3].
87 Michael A. Griffin & Kira J. Johal, Washington State Enacts New Laws Addressing
Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, JACKSON LEWIS (Apr. 3, 2018),
https://www.jacksonlewis.com/publication/washington-state-enacts-new-laws-
addressing-sexual-harassment-workplace [https://perma.cc/4P9H-HSSR].
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Senate Bill (S.B.) 5996 encourages “the disclosure and discussion of
sexual harassment and sexual assault in the workplace.”88 Employers are
prohibited from requiring employees to “sign a nondisclosure agreement,
waiver, or other document that prevents the employee from disclosing sexual
harassment or sexual assault occurring in the workplace.”89 However, the bill
does not prevent confidentiality provisions in settlement agreements, even as
they relate to sexual assault or harassment allegations.90
Another bill introduced in the Washington Senate, S.B. 6313, is meant to
preserve “an employee’s right to file a complaint or cause of action for sexual
harassment or sexual assault.”91 This law aims to “bar any agreement that
requires an employee to resolve claims of discrimination in a confidential
dispute resolution process,” including arbitration.92 However, practitioners
note that “[i]t seems likely that [the law] may be preempted by the Federal
Arbitration Act, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility
LLC. v. Concepcion.”93
b) New York Statute § 7515
In 2018, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo signed into law a number
of new measures that expand current state anti-sexual harassment
protections, including legislation that prohibits the mandatory arbitration of
sexual harassment claims.94 Section 7515(b) is one such attempt.95
88 S.B. 5996, 65th Leg., 2018 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018).
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 S.B. 6313, 65th Leg., 2018 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018).
92 Griffin & Johal, supra note 87.
93 Griffin & Johal, supra note 87.
94 JAMES HWANG & ANDREW REICH, PAUL WEISS, NEW ANTI-SEXUAL HARASSMENT
MEASURES IN NEW YORK STATE AND NEW YORK CITY (May 10, 2018),
https://www.paulweiss.com/media/3977781/10may18harassment.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CUL9-34AX].
95 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7515 (McKinney 2019). Section 7515(b) includes:
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Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg cited § 7515 in her dissenting opinion for
Lamps Plus as an example of state action that “endeavor[s] to safeguard
employees’ opportunities to bring sexual harassment suits in court” and
“ameliorate[s] some of the harm . . . occasioned” by recent Supreme Court
decisions.96 Unfortunately, § 7515 was found to be preempted by the FAA in
Latif v. Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC.97 The Court stated that “[s]ection 7515
renders agreements to arbitrate sexual harassment claims null and void
‘[e]xcept where inconsistent with federal law.’ Here, application of Section
7515 to invalidate the parties’ agreement to arbitrate Latif’s claims would be
inconsistent with the FAA.”98 It was largely expected that the state law would
be preempted;99 however, there has not yet been a case involving the
application of § 7515 to intrastate commerce.
c) California Assembly Bill 3080
Advocates for workers’ rights in California brought a bill that
[p]rohibits a person from conditioning employment, the receipt of
any employment-related benefit or as a condition of entering into a
contractual agreement, on an employee or applicant waiving any
right, forum, or procedure for a violation of any provision the
California Fair Employment and Housing Act or the Labor Code,
(i) Prohibition. Except where inconsistent with federal law, no written contract,
entered into on or after the effective date of this section shall contain a prohibited
clause as defined in paragraph two of subdivision (a) of this section.
(ii) Exceptions. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to impair or
prohibit an employer from incorporating a non-prohibited clause or other
mandatory arbitration provision within such contract, that the parties agree upon.
(iii) Mandatory arbitration clause null and void. Except where inconsistent with
federal law, the provisions of such prohibited clause as defined in paragraph two
of subdivision (a) of this section shall be null and void. The inclusion of such
clause in a written contract shall not serve to impair the enforceability of any
other provision of such contract.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7515(b) (McKinney 2019).
96 Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 U.S. 1407, 1422 (2019) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
97 Latif v. Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, 2019 WL 2610985 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2019).
98 Id.
99 See HWANG & REICH, supra note 94.
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and prohibits a person from threatening, retaliating, or
discriminating against any applicant or employee because of their
refusal to agree to such a waiver.100
Proponents of the bill argue that because of the “recent revelations of
widespread sexual harassment,” policy is needed to protect victims’ access
to the courts and to hold perpetrators accountable.101 The bill does not call
for the end of arbitration, and the author acknowledges that “arbitration is a
highly effective dispute resolution method when both parties chose it
freely.”102 However, the key to effective arbitration is that both parties choose
it freely. Indeed, arbitration “is far less successful when the more powerful
party forces the other to accept the terms.”103
III. HOW WASHINGTON CAN PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES
WHO HAVE BEEN SEXUALLY HARASSED
To prevent the use of mandatory arbitration for sexual harassment claims,
Washington State should focus on preventing the implementation of such
policies. Therefore, Washington should incentivize companies to forgo
forced arbitration, as well as continue to implement state laws aimed at
preventing forced arbitration. Washington State may also protect workers’
rights by acting to prevent companies from keeping claims involving sexual
harassment confidential.
A. Incentives for Companies to End Employee Arbitration Policy
Washington should encourage companies to forgo forced arbitration
policies by utilizing its marketplace power. Title II of the Model State
Consumer and Employee Justice Act (Model Act) prohibits the state from
contracting with any companies that use forced arbitration in employee
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contracts or who contract with companies that use forced arbitration in their
employee contracts.104
In the wake of the #MeToo movement’s media attention, large companies
began ridding themselves of forced arbitration,105 indicating that they may be
open to change. In December 2017, Microsoft voiced support for legislation
invalidating arbitration clauses in cases of sexual harassment,106 including an
endorsement of the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of
2017.107 The company also “pledged to remove [mandatory arbitration
requirements] in the few of its own employment contracts that still contained
such a provision.”108 The company reasoned that “[a]s each new story about
sexual harassment demonstrates, current approaches in this area have proven
insufficient.”109 In addition, in November 2018, Google announced that the
company would no longer require forced arbitration for sexual harassment
and assault claims.110 This announcement came about a week after “20,000
Google employees and contractors around the world walked off the job to
protest the company’s response to sexual harassment claims.”111 The
employees’ demands continued even after the announcement, causing
104 Levinson, supra note 2.
105 Morrissey, supra note 5, at 198; Alexia Fernandez Campbell, Google Employees
Fought for Their Right to Sue the Company – and Won, VOX (Feb. 22, 2019),
https://www.vox.com/technology/2019/2/22/18236172/mandatory-forced-arbitration-
google-employees [https://perma.cc/DU64-YW5C].
106 Morrissey, supra note 5, at 198.
107 Debra Cassens Weiss, Give Victims of Workplace Sexual Harassment Access to Courts,
56 US Attorneys General Tell Congress, ABA J. (Feb. 13, 2018, 10:22 AM CST),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/give_victims_of_workplace_sexual_harassment
_access_to_courts_56_us_attorney [https://perma.cc/Y2R3-WGLC].
108 Morrissey, supra note 5, at 198.
109 Jessica Guynn, Microsoft Supports Bill that Would Allow Sexual Harassment Victims




110 Campbell, supra note 105.
111 Id.
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Google to end all mandatory arbitration for employees in February of
2019.112
In addition to employee and public pressure, potential benefits for
shareholders and corporations present further reasons for companies to do
away with arbitration clauses. “Because the public is kept in the dark about
claims of sexual misconduct, shareholders are unable to identify issues and
pressure directors to make changes in the company culture” before the
scandal is in the headlines and “the damage is already done.”113 It is difficult
to undo the reputational harm that comes from a company becoming
“national fodder for the #MeToo movement.”114 In other words, it is
beneficial to shareholders if they are able to identify a problem before it
grows and causes a massive media fallout. Earlier detection gives
shareholders the opportunity to address concerns with the board and take
steps to limit the impact and growth of sexual harassment.115
If Washington further tips the scale for companies by incentivizing them
to end the use of mandatory arbitration of sexual harassment disputes, then it
may be enough to push more companies to make the choice on their own.
Every company that decides to end the use of mandatory arbitration aids in
the important cultural shift that needs to happen to completely prohibit the
forced arbitration of sexual harassment and sexual assault claims.116
B. Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDAs) in Settlement Agreements and
General Data Disclosure
Washington State moved toward protecting employee rights by prohibiting
employers from requiring employees to sign an NDA as a condition of





116 See Levinson, supra note 2 at, 522.
117 S.B. 5996, 65th Leg., 2018 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018).
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provisions into settlement agreements with employees.118 Therefore,
Washington can improve its laws regarding NDAs by disallowing NDAs in
settlement negotiations.
By allowing NDAs to factor into negotiations, employees are again
required to make a choice between their rights and their financial interests,
the first time being when they are forced to choose between a job and their
access to the courts. When employers are allowed to offer a much higher
settlement with an NDA than without, the claimant’s autonomy is
undermined by forcing her to choose “between a higher settlement or the
capability of sharing her story.”119 Confidentiality provisions do not just hurt
the victim, “confidential settlements of employment discrimination cases
interfere with the important public function of trials in setting workplaces
norms.”120
New York’s solution to the harms of confidentiality provisions is to
prohibit NDAs in any settlement of a sexual harassment claim unless the
complainant requests confidentiality.121 Specifically, employers are
prohibited from including “any term or condition that would prevent the
discloser of the underlying facts and circumstances to the claim or action” in
any settlement, agreement, or other resolution of any claim involving sexual
harassment, unless the employee requests confidentiality.122 Implementing a
similar law in Washington would prevent employers from using an
employee’s right to share her story as a bargaining chip in settlement
discussions. In other words, an employee will not be put in the situation
where she has to choose between a higher settlement payment and her right
to tell her story.
118 Ence, supra note 4, at 175.
119 Id.
120 Nunez, supra note 55, at 513.
121 Ence, supra note 4, at 175; N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-336 (McKinney 2019).
122 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-336 (McKinney 2019).
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In addition to promoting public exposure through lack of NDAs,
Washington can also model California’s efforts to provide more transparency
and accountability for companies through data exposure. For example,
California added section 1281.96 to the California Arbitration Act,123 which
“requires that private arbitration companies publish, at least quarterly,
cumulative reports compiling information over the past five years regarding
their consumer arbitrations.”124 The identity of the complainants remains
confidential, but a potential plaintiff or employee can search the reports to
learn if the employer has been sued before.125 Nondisclosure agreements can
make this system less effective,126 but coupled with Washington’s laws
prohibiting NDAs, these reports could help prevent companies from
repeatedly giving “superstar” employees a slap on the wrist when they harass
other employees.127
The disclosure of data related to mandatory arbitration has the potential to
improve fairness for employees. The disclosure of data “enables media
organizations, as well as consumer and employee advocacy groups, to
highlight the practices of those arbitrators with records that are especially
skewed in favor of business and reveal which companies are using the
services of these unfair arbitrators.”128 Regulating arbitration would not be
the first time data disclosure has been used as a means of industry
regulation.129 “Data disclosure is now being used as a means of regulation in
a wide variety of fields.”130 And, where data disclosure programs have been
123 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1280–1294.4 (West 2020).
124 Ramit Mizrahi, Sexual Harassment Law After #MeToo: Looking to California as a




128 Miles B. Farmer, Mandatory and Fair? A Better System of Mandatory Arbitration, 121
YALE L. J. 2346, 2366 (2012).
129 See Mark A. Cohen & V. Santhakumar, Information Disclosure as Environmental
Regulation: A Theoretical Analysis, 37 ENV’T & RES. ECON. 599, 599–601, 616 (2007).
130 Farmer, supra note 128, at 2365 n.66.
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implemented, they have “often affected the underlying behavior of the
regulated industry and [are] best used in situations such as this, where victims
may be unaware of the costs being imposed on them.”131 Making this data
public could also encourage companies to “try to avoid using arbitrators and
arbitration providers that have been cast as particularly unfair, in order to
avoid the potential public-relations disaster that might stem from such a
situation.”132 In turn, arbitrators may have an increased incentive to remain
impartial, which could counteract even unconscious bias.
C. Adaptation of California’s A.B. 3080 – Criminalizing Opt-Out
Arbitration Clauses
Washington should enact a version of California’s A.B. 3080, which
carries many benefits. First, the law would prohibit employers from requiring
arbitration as a condition of getting a job, keeping it, or receiving benefits.
Second, the law would forbid employers from retaliating against those who
decline to sign. Lastly, the law would make violations of these prohibitions a
crime.133 This law should differ from other state attempts at prohibiting
arbitration by focusing not on the enforceability of arbitration agreements,
but on the ability to enter into mandatory arbitration agreements.
D. “Except Where Inconsistent with Federal Law”
Where Washington law cannot prevent mandatory arbitration agreements,
it should assure that at a minimum, intrastate companies’ mandatory
arbitration agreements are not enforceable. Washington State S.B. 6313
states that
an employment contract or agreement is . . . void and unenforceable
if it requires an employee to waive the employee’s right to publicly
pursue a [sexual harassment] cause of action . . . , or if it requires an
131 Id.
132 Id. at 2366.
133 Assemb. B. No. 3080, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
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employee to resolve claims of discrimination in a dispute resolution
process that is confidential.134
While this bill is consistent with what this article argues for, if challenged,
“this statute would likely be preempted on the same grounds as the statute at
issue in Kindred Nursing—both statutes disfavor arbitration agreements.”135
Even though S.B. 6313 does not explicitly reference mandatory arbitration,
it clearly falls under what would be included in the waiver of employee
rights.136
To make the law as useful as possible, Washington should look to newly
enacted New York law, § 7515.137 The New York law prohibiting mandatory
arbitration includes the following key language: “[E]xcept where
inconsistent with federal law.”138 The hope for the exception is that, if
challenged, “the statute would be upheld for companies operating solely in
New York because intrastate companies are not subject to the FAA.”139 In its
current state, the Washington law will likely be preempted by the FAA. For
the Washington law to serve its purpose, it should be amended to include
New York’s language: “[E]xcept where inconsistent with federal law.”140
Unfortunately, applying a prohibition against forced arbitration solely to
intrastate companies will drastically limit the companies covered; however,
the law is much more useful covering only intrastate companies than none at
all.
It could be argued that in light of Latif v. Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC,141
there would be no purpose to enact any part of New York’s arbitration law
because it was found to be preempted by the FAA. However, as stated above,
134 S.B. 6313, 65th Leg., 2018 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018).
135 McCullough, supra note 34, at 2679.
136 Id.
137 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7515 (McKinney 2019).
138 Id.
139 McCullough, supra note 34, at 2679.
140 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7515 (McKinney 2019).
141 Latif v. Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, 2019 WL 2610985 (SDNY June 26, 2019).
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Latif v. Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC does not address intrastate commerce.142
To ensure that Washington law is not preempted in whole, lawmakers can
write a law that applies solely to intrastate commerce, therefore avoiding the
fate of New York’s § 7515.
E. Encouraging Congress to Act
Unfortunately, U.S. congressional action is the only way Washington can
ensure that no one in the state is forced to arbitrate their sexual harassment
claims. Without an amendment to the FAA, most state actions related to
mandatory arbitration will be subjected to scrutiny or preemption.143
However, that does not mean that Washington should give up its fight to end
forced arbitration of sexual harassment claims. In fact, Washington can
encourage Congress to act by demonstrating the widespread state and public
support for limitations on forced arbitration.
With the rise of the #MeToo movement and newfound media attention on
forced arbitration, “now is the perfect time to lobby for change.”144
Incentivizing and encouraging companies in Washington to abandon forced
arbitration will contribute to a necessary cultural shift by changing normal
and expected company practices.145 Individuals are encouraged to “continue
to contact their state and federal representatives, initiate petitions, contact
people running for elected positions, and voice their grievances.”146
However, individuals are not the only ones who can incite change. All fifty
state Attorneys General signed a letter asking both Senate and House
Representatives to support S.B. 2203.147 The bill, like the Arbitration
142 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7515(b) (McKinney 2019).
143 Levinson, supra note 2, at 520.
144 Id. at 522.
145 See id.
146 Id. at 523.
147 Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of 2017, S. 2203, 115th Cong.
(“This bill prohibits a predispute arbitration agreement from being valid or enforceable if
it requires arbitration of a sex discrimination dispute.”); NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN.,
MANDATORY ARBITRATION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT DISPUTES (2018),
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Fairness Act,148 has yet to make it out of committee in either the House or the
Senate “due to opposition from Republicans and the business community.”149
However, with greater political action—such as continuing to pass state
laws—there is a greater chance that the FAIR Act will eventually be passed
by the Senate and signed by the President.150 Washington State can contribute
to that greater political action by taking steps to eliminate forced arbitration
of sexual harassment claims in the state. In her dissent in Lamps Plus, Inc. v.
Frank Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019), Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg stated,
“developments outside the judicial arena” could “ameliorate some of the
harm this Court’s decisions have occasioned.”151 Washington State can be a
part of those developments by enacting its own laws opposing forced
arbitration.
In sum, Washington should: (1) encourage companies to forgo forced
arbitration policies by prohibiting the state from contracting with any
companies that use forced arbitration in employee contracts or who contract
with other companies that use forced arbitration in their employee
contracts;152 (2) amend its laws on NDAs to look more similar to New York’s
by prohibiting “any term or condition that would prevent the disclosure of
the underlying facts and circumstances to the claim or action,” in any
resolution of any claim involving sexual harassment, unless the employee
requests confidentiality;153 (3) ensure, as California has done, “that private
https://www.manatt.com/Manatt/media/Documents/Articles/AGs-letter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HPY6-WYWE].
148 Arbitration Fairness Act, H.R. 1374, 115th Cong. (2017) (“This bill prohibits a pre-
dispute arbitration agreement from being valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of
an employment, consumer, antitrust, or civil rights dispute.”).
149 Sternlight, supra note 77, at 206.
150 See id.
151 Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 U.S. 1407, 1422 (2019) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
152 DAVID SELIGMAN, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., MODEL STATE CONSUMER &
EMPLOYEE JUSTICE ENFORCEMENT ACT 31–38 (2015),
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/arbitration/model-state-arb-act-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SK5N-233D].
153 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-336 (McKinney 2019).
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arbitration companies publish, at least quarterly, cumulative reports
compiling information over the past five years regarding their consumer
arbitrations”;154 (4) enact a law forbidding employers from retaliating against
employees who decline to sign mandatory arbitration agreements;155 and (5)
amend S.B. 6313 to apply only to intrastate commerce to avoid federal
preemption.156
By taking these actions, Washington State can limit the number of
employees in the state that are subject to mandatory arbitration and
demonstrate to Congress that the states and the public want to do away with
mandatory arbitration. The more companies that forgo forced arbitration, and
the more employees who are not subject to forced arbitration, the more the
culture will shift. In turn, the cultural shift and the momentum of the #MeToo
movement will continue and lead to justice for employees who have been
sexually harassed.
F. Criticisms and Rebuttal
1. Arbitration Is More Accessible than Court
Proponents of mandatory arbitration focus on the accessibility of
arbitration to low-wage workers as a solution to expensive court
proceedings.157 These proponents argue that many employees cannot find
legal representation because their potential dollar recovery would “not justify
the investment of the time and money of a first-rate lawyer in preparing a
court action.”158 For these employees, arbitration serves as a cheaper,
simpler, and more feasible recourse because it will take an attorney much less
time and effort to take a case to arbitration, and if unable to find
154 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1280–1294.4 (West 2020); Mizrahi, supra note 125, at
136.
155 Assemb. B. No. 3080, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
156 S.B. 6313, 65th Leg., 2018 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018); see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7515
(McKinney 2019).
157 Antoine, supra note 57, at 796.
158 Id. at 792–93.
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representation, claimants may represent themselves in this “much less formal
and intimidating forum.”159
While it is true that it can be difficult for employees to find legal
representation for low dollar claims, it is also true that it is harder for a client
subject to arbitration to find legal representation.160 The premise of the
argument for mandatory arbitration is that it is an easier and more accessible
forum for bringing claims; however, there is considerable evidence that
employees subject to mandatory arbitration are less likely to bring claims.161
Other popular arguments for mandatory arbitration include that arbitration
is more cost effective and faster than litigation, and that arbitration has shrunk
court dockets.162 However, despite the frequency of these claims, no
independent study has verified that arbitration “is usually faster, cheaper and
more satisfying for the parties than traditional litigation, or that ADR has
materially shrunk state or federal court dockets.”163 In fact, “[t]he little data
(either anecdotal or empirical) that do[] exist support[] the position that
arbitration may not be as big a savings in cost or time as proponents claim.”164
For instance, data gathered from experiments with arbitration of civil
disputes in the federal courts point to the conclusion that “arbitration does
not materially save time or expense in prosecuting civil cases, and the parties’
satisfaction with this ADR device—to the extent that it can be accurately
measured at all—does not appear to be so high as to outweigh its
uncertainties.”165 Further, “a study of arbitrations involving a California
health maintenance organization found that arbitrations typically took nearly
159 Id. at 792.
160 COLVIN, supra note 21, at 10; see also supra Section II.B.1.
161 COLVIN, supra note 21, at 11.
162 Miles B. Farmer, Mandatory and Fair? A Better System of Mandatory Arbitration, 121
YALE L. J. 2346, 2352 (2012).
163 Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from Using Mandatory
Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L. J. 399, 422 (2000).
164 Id.
165 Id. at 424.
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twenty-nine months to complete in comparison to the relevant trial court
proceedings that lasted fifteen to nineteen months.”166
2. Counterarguments to Model Laws
The California Chamber of Commerce argued against A.B. 3080, asserting
that “[b]y banning arbitration, the only option left for employees to resolve
many labor and employment claims is litigation.”167 However, as stated
above, the bill does not attempt to ban arbitration, but rather prohibits
requiring arbitration as a condition of employment.168 Employees and
employers may still choose to enter into arbitration to resolve a dispute when
that dispute arises. The California Chamber of Commerce continued, stating
that “[s]everal studies support this notion that access to civil courts is not a
realistic option for low wage employees,”169 again ignoring that low wage
employees still have the option to resolve disputes in arbitration. A.B. 3080
does not affect post-dispute arbitration agreements and therefore, the
Chamber’s worries are unfounded. Thus, despite what the Chamber argues,
there is a “viable alternative” to “so-called mandatory arbitrations,”170 and
that alternative is optional arbitration.
Ultimately, the Governor of California vetoed the measure under the
impression that it violated the law.171 The bill was “based on the theory that
the Act only governs the enforcement and not the initial formation of
arbitration agreements,” and the governor stated that the Supreme Court
“rejected the assertion that the Federal Arbitration Act has no application to
contract formation.”172 The governor based this on the Court’s assertion in
166 Id. at 422–23.
167 Cal. Assemb. Floor Analysis, Assemb. B. No. 3080, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. 2 (Oct.
5, 2018).
168 See supra Section III.C.
169 Cal. Assemb. Floor Analysis, Assemb. B. No. 3080, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. 2 (Oct.
5, 2018).
170 Id. at 3.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 3.
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Kindred Nursing that “the Act is not only about the enforcement of arbitration
agreements, but also about their initial ‘valid[ity]’–that is, about what it takes
to enter into them.”173 However, the Court in Kindred Nursing cited
Concepcion, in which “the Court noted the impermissibility of applying a
contract defense like duress ‘in a fashion that disfavors arbitration’” to
establish that state law could not require a power of attorney agreement to
expressly grant an attorney-in-fact the power to bind her principal to an
arbitration agreement.174 While the governor is right that Kindred Nursing
covers the validity of the initial formation of an arbitration agreement, it is
not clear from this case that it would be impermissible to prohibit employers
from retaliating against employees or applicants who refuse to enter into an
arbitration agreement.
A.B. 3080 does not propose banning arbitration agreements or making all
arbitration agreements unenforceable. Rather, the goal is to prevent
employees from having to choose between their job and their right to access
the court system. This goal can be differentiated from Kindred Nursing, and
while it is true that law could be preempted, there is reason enough to believe
it may not be.
Arguments that the law would be preempted cite a line of federal cases that
rely upon the FAA to uphold arbitration agreements imposed on a “take-it-
or-leave-it” basis.175 However, this law does not consider the validity of
agreements entered into as a condition of being hired; rather, it focuses on
the legality of requiring such agreements and retaliating against those who
do not sign.
Considering that mandatory arbitration does not increase the accessibility
of justice for low-wage workers, is not more cost effective for employers, is
173 Id.; Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 U.S. 1421, 1428 (2017).
174 Kindred, 137 U.S. at 1424.
175 Benjamin Ebbink, Will He or Won’t He? Employment Arbitration Ban Proposal Heads
to Governor Brown, FISHER PHILLIPS (Aug. 28, 2018),
https://www.fisherphillips.com/california-employers-blog/will-he-or-wont-he-
employment-arbitration [https://perma.cc/4SFT-PS2T].
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not faster than litigation, and is not materially reducing the number of cases
in the court system, one should wonder why mandatory arbitration is being
used at all. If the supposed advantages to arbitration are not advantages at all,
then employers have been mistaken in their use of arbitration, or the
purported advantages are a mere mask of employers’ true motive: to
disproportionately advantage employers.
IV. CONCLUSION
Washington must continue to enact laws that prevent the use of mandatory
arbitration for sexual harassment claims. While the path to changing the
practice and culture surrounding mandatory arbitration will likely not be easy
or clear, it is important that Washington protects the rights of employees. It
may be particularly difficult if Congress continues to refuse to change federal
law and the Supreme Court continues to interpret the FAA broadly; however,
that does not mean that the state is without any course of action or that it has
done all it can do. Washington needs to enact laws that try to prevent the
implementation of mandatory arbitration, as California attempted to do with
A.B. 3080, as well as take additional indirect approaches to eradicate this
unfair practice. Washington can change the culture and the norms of
employment in the state by incentivizing companies to reject mandatory
arbitration clauses. Washington can also work to make current practices
fairer by requiring a wide disclosure of arbitration data as well as disallowing
NDAs in arbitration agreements. By changing the laws and the culture of
Washington State employment, Washington will not only improve conditions
for its workers, but also encourage Congress to act to prohibit mandatory
arbitration for sexual harassment claims. Employers should not benefit at the
expense of employees who have been sexually harassed.
Now, in the era of #MeToo, it is time for Washington State to take
advantage of the energy surrounding preventing sexual harassment and
assault in order to implement real change. Washington has acknowledged
that between twenty-five and eighty-five percent of women have experienced
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sexual harassment in the workplace.176 Now, the state must continue to act in
pursuit of justice and with a goal of changing the problematic culture of
sexual harassment in the workplace. Sexual harassment must not be swept
under the rug by confidential settlements and mandatory arbitration.
176 FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 86.
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